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Abstract
Background: Crowdfunding has risen rapidly as a way of raising funds to support
projects such as art projects, charity projects, and new ventures. It is very important
to understand how crowds in the crowdfunding market are organized to carry out
various activities. This study documents and compares two crowd designs for
crowdfunding, namely pure crowds, where all crowd members participate as equals,
and hybrid crowds, where crowd members are led by an expert investor. The hybrid
design is rarely studied in the crowdfunding literature despite its large presence in
equity crowdfunding.
Methods: We examine industry practices from various countries in terms of crowd
designs, review relevant literature on this topic, and develop a conceptual framework
for choosing between pure and hybrid crowds.
Results: We identify several inefficiencies of pure crowds in crowdfunding platforms
and discuss the advantages of hybrid crowds. We then develop a
conceptual framework that illustrates the factors for choosing between pure and
hybrid crowds. Finally, we discuss the issue of how to manage and regulate lead
investors in hybrid crowds.
Conclusions: Pure crowds have several shortcomings that could be mitigated by a
hybrid crowd design, especially when the proposed project suffers from greater risks,
a high degree of information asymmetry, concerns about information leakage, and a
high cost of managing the crowds. But for the hybrid crowd to work well, one must
carefully design mechanisms for lead investor selection, compensation, and
discipline. Our study contributes to the crowdfunding literature and to crowdfunding
practice in multiple ways.
Keywords: Crowdfunding, Wisdom of the crowds, Crowd design, Lead investor,
Syndicate
Background
Over the past 10 years, crowdfunding has risen rapidly as a popular way of raising
funds to support projects such as small personal loans, new product development, art
projects, charity projects, and new ventures. Crowdfunding removes traditional financial
intermediaries and lets project creators directly appeal to investors through an Internet
platform. As a funding platform, the Internet has undeniable appeal in terms of reaching
a large crowd of small investors1 and supporting efficient information dissemination and
transaction processing. Amid this disintermediation is the unprecedented reliance on
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crowds, defined as a large number of non-experts, for tasks such as gathering project
information, evaluating project risks, and deciding whether a project should be funded.
Although the phenomenon termed the “wisdom of the crowds,” defined as when a
collection of non-experts outperforms a few experts, has often been found to occur
when judgment and prediction tasks are carried out, the total reliance on crowds does
pose several issues for crowdfunding. For instance, an average crowd member may be
either unqualified or unwilling to conduct the due diligence necessary for evaluating
project risks. Managing many crowd investors can also prove to be unwieldy for most
project creators. These limitations raise an important question about the use of crowd-
funding: how can we design crowds to avoid their common shortcomings?
Based on the foregoing, this study explores the issue of crowd design for crowdfunding,
particularly how crowds are organized in a crowdfunding market to carry out various
activities. Based on industry practices, it focuses on two popular forms of crowd designs:
pure crowds, where all investors in the crowd participate as equals, and hybrid crowds2,
where a crowd of investors are led by an expert investor.
A pure crowd design requires the crowd members to play many roles in a crowdfunding
platform, including supplying funds, choosing and evaluating projects, gathering project
information, and monitoring and promoting a project. However, several barriers prevent
an unorganized crowd from fulfilling some of these roles. First, some activities such as due
diligence are “public goods” in the sense that efforts by one crowd member can benefit
others. A common problem associated with the private provision of public goods is the
“tragedy of the commons,” where an individual member has insufficient incentives to carry
out an activity that benefits others (Adar and Huberman 2000; Krishnan et al. 2003). More-
over, relying on the wisdom of the crowds has limitations for evaluating the merits of a
project. Because crowd members are not generally experts, they infer project quality by
observing the decisions made by their peers (Zhang and Liu 2012). A lack of independence
undermines the wisdom of the crowds, causing biases and large uncertainties in the out-
come (Salganik et al. 2006; Lorenz et al. 2011). Finally, when a project faces tens of
hundreds of crowd investors, managing and communicating with crowd members
becomes cumbersome and inefficient.
A syndicate of investors led by an expert lead investor might provide a good solution to
overcome the limitation of pure crowds (Deschler 2013). Unlike smaller investors in the
crowd, a lead investor is generally highly knowledgeable about valuing risky projects and
ventures. Lead investors have the incentives (their get a share of profit from successful
projects) and expertise to carry out costly activities such as due diligence, project monitor-
ing, and brokering the communication between project creators and crowd investors.
The question of crowd design has been explored in various studies. For example, the
literature on prediction markets has studied the aggregation rules and incentive
schemes used to assimilate the opinions of a crowd to provide the most accurate
prediction. Studies have also investigated how to design voting rules for crowd-based
voting. However, this study departs from the aforementioned work in two important
ways. First, we examine a different context (i.e., crowdfunding), which has distinct tasks
and goals. Second, we study the hybrid crowd design for the first time in this strand of
the literature. Through this work, we aim to answer two important questions: how
should we choose between pure and hybrid crowds and if a hybrid crowd is used, how
should we manage the lead investors?
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Industry Background discusses
industry practices in terms of crowd designs and Related Literature reviews the relevant
literature on this topic. Based on our observations, we propose several factors that may
favor one or other type of crowd design in Use of Pure and Hybrid Crowds. Managing
Lead Investors discusses the managerial and regulation issues associated with managing
the lead investors in the crowd. Finally, Conclusion concludes the paper and offers
future research directions.
Industry background
While all crowdfunding platforms rely on crowd participation, the ways in which crowd
members participate in the funding processes differ, especially regarding whether they
are guided by lead investors. To understand different crowd designs, we investigate four
types of crowdfunding platforms (Wilson and Testoni 2014): donation-based, lending-
based (also known as peer-to-peer lending), reward-based, and equity-based (see Table 1).
We pay special attention to how each type of platform organizes the crowd, especially





















China Equity ¥200M 150 20,000 Pure Risk warning
360 Taojin https://
t.360.cn/
China Equity ¥304M 7 - Pure -
CrowdCube https://
crowdcube.com/








US Equity $275M 205 - Pure -
ASSOB https://
assob.com.au/
Australia Equity $145M - - Pure Due diligence
36kr https://36jr.com/ China Equity - - - Hybrid Risk warning
JD Dongjia https://
dj.jd.com/
China Equity ¥1,280M 107 76,104 Hybrid -
AngelCrunch http://
angelcrunch.com/
China Equity - - - Hybrid -
Kickstarter https://
kickstarter.com/
US Reward $2,651M 113,220 11,736,206 Pure crowd Risk warning
Indiegogo https://
indiegogo.com/
US Reward - - - Pure crowd -
Zhongchou http://
zhongchou.com/
China Reward - - - Pure crowd -
Lending Club https://
lendingclub.com/
US Debt $22 B - - Pure crowd Risk warning
Prosper https://
prosper.com/
US Debt $6 B - - Pure crowd Risk warning
FirstP2P https://
firstp2p.com/
China Debt ¥139 B 60,513,414 3,105,548 Pure crowd Risk Warning
GoFundMe https://
gofundme.com/
US Donation $3 B - - Pure crowd -
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whether it formally provides lead investors, as well as examine information on type of
crowdfunding platform, services offered, size, and location.
Pure crowds
We use “pure crowds” to refer to the straightforward crowd design in which crowd
members participate as equal investors (i.e., no one member assumes the formal role of
the lead investor). Kickstarter (https://www.kickstarter.com/) is a good example. Each
crowd member on Kickstarter can use the platform to browse or search for projects.
For each project, members can view the project profile and receive signals of progress
such as the percentage of funding and number of existing investors. The platform also
provides a Q&A area for potential investors to ask project creators questions. A poten-
tial investor can combine these signals and his/her own judgment to decide whether to
invest in the project. On some platforms, social networking tools are available for in-
vestors (Liu et al. 2015; Zhang and Liu 2012), although any “following” stays informal:
the followed do not assume special responsibilities or receive any explicit reward.
The pure crowd design is popular among crowdfunding platforms, especially reward-
based ones. Other examples of pure crowds include IndieGoGo (https://www.indiegogo.
com/), as well as regional platforms such as ZhongChou (http://www.zhongchou.com/), a
leading crowdfunding platform in China. Even among the more complex equity-based
crowdfunding platforms, the pure crowd design is still popular, such as 360 Taojin
(https://t.360.cn/) in China, CowdCube (https://www.crowdcube.com/) and Seedrs
(https://www.seedrs.com/) in the United Kingdom, CircleUp (https://circleup.com/)
in the United States, and ASSOB (https://assob.com.au/) in Australia.
Hybrid crowds
Hybrid crowds use lead investors, which are described as “well-versed, experienced investors
who spend the time conducting due diligence on a venture, and invest a large amount in an
equity crowdfunding campaign” (Rose 2016). Lead investors perform several roles in the
crowdfunding process such as identifying projects and bringing them to the platform, con-
ducting due diligence on projects, reporting to crowd investors, promoting a crowdfunding
campaign, monitoring an ongoing project, and providing followers with project updates.
Lead investors are also required to invest a significant proportion of the total investment
amount to signal their commitment to and confidence in the project. Crowd investors often
choose projects based on whether it is backed by a lead investor as well as what the lead
investor says about the project.
However, although lead investors perform many of the roles typically carried out by
traditional financial intermediaries (e.g., banks, charity organizations, venture capitalists),
there are several differences between the two types. First, lead investors are selected from
the crowd; indeed, any accredited investor on platforms may become the lead. Further,
lead investors supplement rather than replace direct investments by crowd members. The
two coexist in a hybrid crowd (whereas some traditional financial intermediaries may pre-
clude direct investments).
Hybrid crowds are currently only seen in equity-based crowdfunding. In fact,
hybrid crowds are widely employed in equity crowdfunding. For example, 36kr
(https://www.36jr.com/), a Beijing-based equity-based crowdfunding platform,
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provides all the features of a pure crowd design including funding progress, a
Q&A area, and project profile pages in addition to a formal lead investor. After a
project is posted online, an investor, often an institutional investor, may apply to
become the lead investor for the project. The platform delegates the task of
choosing the lead investor to the project creator. If the project is successfully
funded, the lead receives a small percentage, usually 2%, of the total amount
raised as a service fee.
After the project is successfully funded, the lead investor and his or her co-investors
form a Limited Liability Partnership company with the lead playing the role of the General
Partner and the rest serving as Limited Partners. When the project exits from the venture,
by way of compensation for lead investors’ efforts and the risk they take, they are often
paid in the form of a “carry,” that is, a proportion of the total exit profits (typically around
20%). Hence, lead investors serve as a catalyst for unlocking investment from others be-
cause the commitment and endorsement from a lead investor gives confidence to other
crowd investors.
In addition to 36kr, other examples of hybrid crowds are JD Dongjia (https://dj.jd.com/)
and AngelCrunch (http://angelcrunch.com/). AngelList, a world-renowned equity-based
crowdfunding platform, implements a variation of the hybrid crowd design, where lead
investors, instead of project creators, bring projects to the platform. Lead investors and
their co-investors form a syndicate with the purpose of making a single investment (e.g.,
in a tech startup). Crowd investors can then apply to join one or several syndicates. If a
syndicate exits from its investment, 5–20% of total profits will go to the lead investor and
5% to the platform.
The hybrid crowd design is not limited to crowdfunding platforms. An Israel-based
social trading platform called eToro also institutes a lead investor scheme on its trading
platform. Traders on this platform can follow “popular investors” and copy their trading
strategies, and popular investors are rewarded with a fixed payment up to 2% of their
annual assets for the copiers they attract.
Related literature
Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is a relatively new way of collecting small amounts of funding by directly
appealing to potential investors via the Internet. It often requires investors to judge
project risks. Research suggests that risk judgment associated with loans and ventures
may require special knowledge and expertise (Diacon 2004; Glaser and Weber 2007).
However, individual investors in a pure crowd typically invest relatively small amounts
of money and receive a relatively small stake of a company in return (e.g., Malmendier
and Shanthikumar 2007). Thus, they may not have the necessary expertise to reach a
high-quality risk judgment.
To compensate for the lack of “wisdom” of an average crowd member, the platform
often leverages the wisdom of the crowds by, for example, instituting a “provision point
mechanism” such that project creators will not receive funds unless the target invest-
ment is reached (Agrawal et al. 2013; Belleflamme and Lambert 2014). Crowdfunding
platforms allow individual investors to leverage the wisdom of the crowds through
observational learning (Zhang and Liu 2012), by highlighting the number of existing
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investors and overall progress towards the funding goal (Ahlers et al. 2015). However,
the wisdom of the crowds is not without its limitations, as discussed in Pure Crowds
and the Limitations of the Wisdom of the Crowds.
Crowdfunding is an example of a two-sided market with project creators on one side
and investors on the other. As with many two-sided markets, information asymmetry is
one of the largest barriers to market efficiency and liquidity. Crowdfunding investors
still face great uncertainty about the quality and authenticity of projects because insuffi-
cient information about projects may be available and it may be difficult to authenticate
the voluntary information disclosed by project creators.
Crowdfunding platforms adopt different strategies to gather information and reduce
this high level of information asymmetry. Some platforms dispatch employees to work
with project creators to gather information and ascertain their authenticity. Others set
up branches and local offices, and act more like a traditional bank. However, each of
these remedies requires investment in capital and human resources to support offline
activities, which can severely limit the scalability of online crowdfunding platforms.
When crowdfunding platforms incur these overheads, they are also in more direct
competition with traditional intermediaries.
A hybrid crowd offers another way of alleviating information asymmetry. By crowd-
sourcing the due diligence and other necessary functions to lead investors, the crowd-
funding platform can continue to function as an online platform. In this way, lead
investors can fulfill the roles that an average crowd member is unwilling or unable to
do. By investing significantly in a project, a lead investor can also boost investor confi-
dence and increase the liquidity of crowdfunding markets. We discuss the literature on
pure and hybrid crowds in more detail in the next two subsections.
Pure crowds and the limitations of the wisdom of the crowds
A pure crowd design, the original concept of crowdfunding, has received the most
research attention on this topic. By leveraging the wisdom of the crowds, pure crowds can
work well in certain market conditions. In terms of the quality of investment decisions,
Mollick and Nanda (2016) find a significant agreement between the funding decisions of
crowds on Kickstarter (a pure crowd platform) and those of the experts they surveyed. In
terms of judging project quality, Mollick (2014) finds that crowd investors largely respond
to quality signals and suggests that their crowdfunding decisions are linked to the chance
of a project succeeding.
However, a pure crowd design has some limitations. In a pure crowd, investors assume
that prior investment decisions are justified by private information, and thus consider
accumulated capital to be a quality signal. Consequently, they may decide to imitate prior
decisions, leading to “herding” behavior (Zhang 2013; Zhang and Liu 2012; Agrawal et al.
2013; Vismara 2015). However, herding could be a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
it could be rational if based on observational or social learning. A thoughtful investor can
draw useful inferences by combining peer investment decisions and publicly observable
project characteristics. Zhang and Liu (2012) and Kim and Viswanathan (2014) find that
rational herding exists in crowdfunding. On the other hand, herding behavior could also
be irrational because investors are afraid to lose the opportunity to invest and blindly
follow prior investors without questioning the soundness of their judgments (Moritz et al.
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2015). Even when it is rational to herd, the investor could still suffer a loss, as prior deci-
sions may contain little to no information (Banerjee 1992).
Second, the cascade of information from early investors to later ones could be manipu-
lated, especially when non-quality factors such as friendship and reciprocity are involved
in the early stage of a fundraising process. For instance, Hekman and Brussee (2013) find
that a person with high social capital, regardless of the quality of his or her project, is
more likely to successfully raise funds on Kickstarter. Furthermore, Liu et al. (2015) show
that friends of the project creators on PPDai, especially close offline friends, act as finan-
cial pipes by fund money. Zvilichovsky et al. (2013) also find that reciprocity exists on
Kickstarter: a project owner’s backing history has a significant effect on his or her finan-
cing outcomes. They also find that projects created by active investors have higher success
rates, attract more investors, and collect more funds. Agrawal et al. (2013) point out that
friends and family disproportionately invest early in the funding cycle, generating a signal
for later investors through accumulated capital. Without conducting an objective and ac-
curate assessment of project quality, these non-quality factors can thus lead to biased
judgments, causing inefficient fund allocation.
The third issue with the pure crowd design is home bias, that is, the effect of geography
(Lin and Viswanathan 2015). Agrawal et al. (2013) point out that funding in non-equity
crowdfunding is not geographically constrained. Agrawal et al. (2011) find that the average
distance between artists and investors on Sellaband is about 3,000 miles and that 86% of
funds come from individuals more than 60 miles away from the project creator, suggesting
a reduced role for spatial proximity. They attribute this geographic effect to the fact that
investors are willing to have a personal connection with the project creators (the social
effect). However, by using data from Prosper.com and employing a quasi-experimental de-
sign, Lin and Viswanathan (2015) find evidence that home bias still exists in crowdfunding.
Unlike Agrawal et al. (2011, 2015), they find that such home bias cannot be fully explained
by the social effect. They further demonstrate that economic motivations (e.g., higher
expected returns) alone cannot explain home bias and that behavioral motivations such as
familiarity with the home state, emotional attachment, and simple homophily play an
important role. Thus, home bias could be rational (physical proximity facilitates information
acquisition) or irrational (emotional attachment or hindrance).
Surowiecki (2004) suggests that the wisdom of the crowds requires three key condi-
tions: the crowd must be diverse, its members must be independent, and it must have a
particular kind of decentralization. To fully achieve the wisdom of the crowds, a crowd
should make independent decisions, free of predecessors’ investment decisions, cogni-
tive bias, emotional hindrance, and psychological influence (Lin and Viswanathan
2015). However, in practical pure crowd designs, these assumptions are inevitably
violated, raising questions about the efficiency of the pure crowd design.
Finally, pure crowds can also suffer from information asymmetry because of the high
cost of conducting due diligence. For example, Agrawal et al. (2016) compare syndi-
cated and non-syndicated deals on AngelList and find that syndicates enhance eco-
nomic growth by reducing market failures and allocating capital more efficiently
because they significantly reduce the information asymmetry problem.
Deschler (2013) also points out the potential problem of liquidity in pure crowds: a
crowd of investors with voting power in equity crowdfunding emits a warning signal
for professional investors who might otherwise have bought into a crowdfunded
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company. However, the author demonstrates that a syndicate could be a good solution
to the liquidity problem because all crowdfunding investors would be rounded into a
single vehicle with a professional manager ensuring that investors’ voices are heard as
well as keeping the business attractive to future rounds of financing. All these limita-
tions suggest that an alternative crowd design may be required.
Hybrid crowds
The literature on hybrid crowds is scarce compared with pure crowds. Overall, hybrid
crowds with lead investors embrace the key success factors shared among successful
venture capital firms while leveraging the benefits of crowdfunding (Coppey 2016).
Lead investors in a hybrid crowd are generally highly knowledgeable about valuing
startups and assessing founding teams compared with small investors. Furthermore,
relative to their investments, the costs for lead investors to conduct due diligence (e.g.,
evaluating project ideas and teams) are small (Ahlers et al. 2015).
Despite these benefits of hybrid crowds, however, costs and challenges are associated
with this design. First, lead investors typically take a 20% cut from the total profits,
which adds a significant cost. Second, Deschler (2013) cautions that while the idea of a
syndicate seems relatively straightforward, this is a complicated area of financing. Once
seasoned veterans of venture capital and their lawyers are brought in as lead investors,
unsophisticated investors stand at a significant disadvantage. In addition, many open
questions remain for platforms and policymakers, such as how to identify, compensate,
and discipline lead investors as well as how to prevent lead investors from colluding
with project creators.
A framework for choosing between pure and hybrid crowds
Crowdfunding is an example of a two-sided market in which project creators and investors
meet to create value by funding high-quality projects (see Fig. 1). For this to happen, several
steps are necessary. First, a project needs to be identified, which is followed by gathering
project information. Once the project is launched online, its information is disseminated
among potential investors, who then evaluate projects and decide whether to invest in it. If
the project reaches its funding goal, it may be monitored to ensure the successful delivery
of the promised benefits to investors. Each of these steps may require the participation of
one or several stakeholders including the platform, the project creator, and investors. For
example, information gathering may occur through voluntary disclosure by the project
creator or independent research by the platform or investors.
Fig. 1 Crowdfunding Process
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The goal of crowdfunding is to successfully and efficiently fund projects worthy of
investment. A good crowdfunding platform should thus help worthwhile projects
collect the desired funds and produce (tangible or intangible) returns to investors as
well as the platform; a good platform should also filter out unworthy and fraudulent
projects. However, the inherent information asymmetry among project creators, inves-
tors, and the platform may lead to inefficient funding outcomes including failing to
fund a worthy project and/or funding an unworthy one. Non-negligible transaction
costs in the aforementioned steps may also prevent worthy projects from being funded.
Whether a crowdfunding project could benefit from a pure or hybrid crowd design
depends on the transaction costs and degree of information asymmetry at the different
stages of crowdfunding as well as on whether adequate remedies are in place to overcome
such challenges. As presented in Fig. 2, we propose a framework for choosing between
pure and hybrid crowd designs, organizing the potential driving factors of the crowd de-
sign choice by stakeholders: project creators, the platform, and investors. This framework
may be relevant for investors (i.e., the choice of investing in a pure or hybrid crowd plat-
form or project), project creators (i.e., the choice of launching their campaign on a pure
or hybrid crowd platform), and platforms (i.e., the choice of crowd design).
Project creator factors
The characteristics of the project and its creators can play a significant role in choosing
the most appropriate crowd design. Next, we consider four major factors: project risk,
information availability, information leakage, and the cost of managing the crowd.
Project risk
From the perspective of an investor, the project is riskier if it demands a larger and longer-
term investment, is at an early stage of development, or involves a highly innovative product
or service whose market potential is uncertain. Many early-stage projects and ventures fall
into the category of high-risk projects (Agrawal et al. 2013; Ahlers et al. 2015).
When a project is risker, it demands more due diligence. While a pure crowd may work
when the cost of due diligence is small, the presence of a lead investor would work better
if heavy-duty due diligence is required. Moreover, assessing a risky project requires a great
deal of expertise (Diacon 2004; Glaser and Weber 2007). Crowd investors may not have
the same level of expertise as lead investors. Indeed, experts’ specialist knowledge or skills
Fig. 2 A Framework for Choosing between Pure and Hybrid Crowds
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should make them better problem-solvers than non-experts, particularly in a complex
and dynamic environment Fuglseth and Grønhaug (1995). For example, Byrne (2005)
reveals that experts exhibit a positive correlation in risk–return judgments, whereas
novices show no such correlation. Moreover, when a project’s risk is high, crowd investors
are reluctant to invest; hence, having an expert lead investor raises the confidence of
crowd investors. In sum, we propose:
Proposition 1 The riskier a project is, the more advantageous a hybrid crowd is over a
pure crowd.
Information availability
Project creators must provide the basic information required by the government and
the crowdfunding platform. In addition, project creators may disclose other informa-
tion such as industry trends, product information, and risk information. Previous
research (Lewis 2011; Ahlers et al. 2015) has shown that information disclosure is an
important success factor in two-sided markets because this can reduce information
asymmetry. For example, Ahlers et al. (2015) find that providing more detailed infor-
mation about risks can be interpreted as an effective signal that can increase the likeli-
hood of funding success.
However, the amount of information available for disclosure depends on the project.
For new projects and “small-time” entrepreneurs, insufficient information and historical
data might be available; by contrast, repeated projects can have more demonstrable infor-
mation. In some countries, hard data such as credit scores are available for disclosure.
Moreover, early-stage projects have less information to disclose than late-stage projects.
A lack of project information poses a greater threat to pure crowds because of the
tragedy of the commons. When more information about a project or its creator is
available, pure crowds operate effectively and save the cost of deploying an inter-
mediary. By contrast, in a limited information environment, a hybrid crowd is more
likely to succeed by paying an intermediary to gather the necessary information.
Thus:
Proposition 2 The less information on a project available, the more advantageous a
hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
Information leakage
When project creators are required to disclose their innovations or sensitive information in
a public forum, they may be disincentivized because their innovations could be imitated or
stolen by their competitors, especially during the fundraising period (Agrawal et al. 2013).
The risk of information leakage is reduced in the hybrid crowd design, where sensitive infor-
mation can be disclosed to a single lead investor who can then assess it and provide a
verdict to crowd investors without disclosing the actual information. Therefore, when pro-
ject creators perceive a higher risk of information leakage, they may prefer a hybrid crowd
over a pure one.
This concern about information leakage may vary across project types and stages.
Some projects such as concerts and commercials can benefit from information leakage
because they can then attract more word-of-mouth before their formal launch. How-
ever, other projects such as high-tech startups involve intellectual properties that are
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easily imitable; hence, their project creators may hesitate to launch their campaigns to
a pure crowd for fear of laying bare their innovation to the public. Hence:
Proposition 3 The higher the concern about information leakage, the more advanta-
geous a hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
Cost of managing the crowd
In a pure crowd, project creators must manage many investors. Directly engaging a
large crowd is not without its costs. Crowds may raise many questions about a project
that need to be answered in a timely manner. In reward-based crowdfunding, delivering
the rewards to each investor can be a great hassle to a project creator. Wortham (2012)
records that project creators can spend too much time answering emails and making
T-shirts for their investors, leaving too little time to build the software. Allowing the
entire crowd to monitor an ongoing project after its successful funding is also ineffi-
cient since the creator may need to respond to repeat inquiries. This process can be ex-
tremely costly as the number of investors rises (Agrawal et al. 2013). By contrast, it is
more efficient for the project creator to engage the crowd through a single voice,
namely the lead investor. Hence, as hybrid crowds remove the direct interaction be-
tween investors and project creators, the latter can focus on their core business. Hence:
Proposition 4 The higher the cost of managing the crowd, the more advantageous a
hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
Investor characteristics
The characteristics of investors may also influence the choice between pure and hybrid
crowds. We consider several investor-specific factors, including desirable investor
involvement and the cost of information acquisition and processing.
Desirable investor involvement
The decision-making process of venture capital investment is time-consuming and
labor- intensive because a lot of information must be collected and analyzed and
several rounds of evaluation should be conducted before a proposal is funded (Fried and
Hisrich 1994). Although the Internet facilitates information gathering and processing,
investors still face great challenges given the large number of projects available. In some
crowdfunding projects, investors may thus need to be willing to forgo some return in
exchange for less involvement in the project selection and evaluation. In others, they may
be more willing to take on such roles. Hence:
Proposition 5 The higher the desirable involvement of investors in the investment
process, the less advantageous a hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
Cost of information acquisition and processing
Financial investment is a complex decision, and it takes time and resources to acquire
and process information, especially when an investor has limited investment experience
and knowledge. Owing to the information asymmetry between investors and project
creators, the former must acquire and process additional information. Further, investors
may not believe all the information provided by the project creator and may need to
double check such information. In addition, although some information such as
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industry trends and market potential is a public good, investors may not want to
collect this because of the possibility of free riding (Agrawal et al. 2013; Zhunussov
2015). If it is costly for individual investors to acquire and process investment infor-
mation (because of their incapability or unwillingness, or the high opportunity cost),
an intermediary could be recruited; under this arrangement, each individual investor
need only pay a small amount of money for the information acquired, analyzed, and
disclosed by the intermediary. Thus,
Proposition 6 The higher the level of investor sophistication, the less advantageous a
hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
Platform
We have thus far proposed that recruiting a lead investor can overcome the informa-
tion asymmetry and transaction cost problems associated with crowdfunding processes.
However, lead investors are not the only party that can provide these services. Indeed,
the platform itself can serve some, if not all, of these roles.
Platform involvement
Crowdfunding platforms are predominantly for-profit businesses, and their revenue model
is based on a transaction fee for successful projects (Agrawal et al. 2013). Thus, they want
to maximize the number and size of successful projects by attracting high-quality projects
and many investors. When barriers to successful transactions arise, the platform has an
incentive to step in to provide additional services to facilitate the transaction. These services
include project accreditation, project recommendation, information gathering, project
evaluation, project monitoring, community building (social networking), investor training,
and reputation tracking. When a platform provides more services, it reduces the need for a
third-party intermediary such as a lead investor. Thus, a pure crowd can be better
supported without lead investors. Therefore,
Proposition 7 The higher the involvement of the platform in the investment process,
the less advantageous a hybrid crowd is over a pure crowd.
That said, the platform may incur non-trivial costs for providing these services. For
example, by hiring field agents to gather project information, the platform becomes
more labor-intensive and less scalable. The platform may also undermine its neutral
position by playing both investor and matchmaker.
Managing lead investors
Why it is important for crowdfunding platforms to manage lead investors?
In a hybrid crowd, lead investors have a great impact on crowd investors, project crea-
tors and crowdfunding platform. As information asymmetry always exists between
crowd investors and project creators, crowd investors much leverage the expertise of
lead investors to reduce such asymmetry. The quality of jobs such as due diligence and
risk disclosure conducted by lead investors has a direct impact on crowd investors’
investment judgement. As for project creators, endorsement by a prominent lead
investor serves as signal of quality and impacts project success because lead investors
have good investment records and reputation. At the platform side, lead investors can
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attract more crowd investors and promote project success, which aligns with platform’s
interests in maximizing revenue.
Because crowd investors tend to place great trust in lead investors, any imprudence,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by lead investors may influence a crowdfunding
market. Owing to the elevated power of lead investors and strong financial incentives
attached, the management and regulation of lead investors require special attention.
However, the literature on how to manage and regulate lead investors is scarce3. Based
on this gap in the literature, our goal here is to summarize existing practices and high-
light management and regulation challenges.
Lead investors may represent crowd investors (e.g., for conducting due diligence),
project creators (e.g., for promoting and endorsing projects), and platforms (e.g., for
identifying projects and promoting project success), so the management of lead inves-
tors can be analyzed by using the principle–agent framework, except that the situation
here is complex because multiple principals exist. Hence, lead investors must be quali-
fied and properly trained for their job through the use of selection and qualification
mechanisms. Once they enter the role, they should be properly rewarded for desirable
efforts and penalized for undesirable ones through disciplinary mechanisms. Table 2
summarizes some of the selection, compensation, and disciplining mechanisms used by
hybrid crowd platforms.
Selection mechanisms
Lead investor qualification is both a management issue and a domain of law. While no spe-
cial laws specify qualifications for lead investors, laws for qualified investors do exist. In the
United States, for example, according to the JOBS Act (Title III), investment by crowd
investors is limited within a 12-month period: if an investor’s annual income or net worth is
less than $100,000, his or her investment limit is the greater of $2,000 and 5% the lesser of
the investor’s annual income or net worth; if both annual income and net worth are equal
to or more than $100,000, then the investor’s limit is 10% of the lesser of their annual
income or net worth. Moreover, during the 12-month period, the aggregate amount of
securities sold to an investor through all regulation crowdfunding offerings may not exceed
$100,000 regardless of the investor’s annual income or net worth4. Although the JOBS Act
enables more individuals in the United States to join crowdfunding, the barriers to entry
globally are still high. For instance, in China, securities regulations define individuals with
an annual income of ¥300,000 or a net worth of ¥1 million as accredited investors. To meet
these financial criteria, accredited investors should be high-net-worth individuals such as
angels or institutions such as venture capitalists and wealth management groups. All these
basic requirements are also applicable to a qualified lead investor.
Table 2 Sample Platforms with Lead Investors
Platform Incentives for experts Selection of experts Risk control
AngelList https://angel.co/ Carry (20%) Accredited by platform Lead, at least 20% of a deal
36kr https://36jr.com/ Carry (20%) Accredited by platform Lead, at least 20% of a deal
JD Dongjia https://dj.jd.com/ Carry (20%) Accredited by platform Lead, at least 20% of a deal
AngelCrunch http://
angelcrunch.com/
Carry (20%) Accredited by platform Lead, at least 20% of a deal
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Within the framework of the law, platforms can implement their own rules for select-
ing accredited lead investors. On Yuanshihui, for example, the platform opens one pos-
ition for a lead investor for each online venture project. All qualified investors, either
an individual or institutional investor, can apply for the position by demonstrating their
reasons and qualification. The platform also authorizes the project creator to select one
lead from all applicants5. AngelList, by contrast, lets the lead select a project and bring
it to the platform. Although it is easy to be an accredited investor in the United States,
a set of rigorous criteria are provided by crowdfunding platforms such as AngelList to
select leads who are qualified to launch syndicates.
A lead investor is supposed to work independently of the project in which he or she
invests (just as auditors should be independent of the company they audit). Allowing a
project creator to choose the lead grants the former implicit power to influence the
lead (e.g., being influenced by flattery), thereby causing collusion concerns. There may
be fewer concerns if leads are selected by the platform, which also has vested interests
in maximizing funding successes. A crowd-selected lead thus seems to better align the
interests of lead investors with its primary principle, namely crowd investors. However,
no such case has thus far been implemented in any crowdfunding platform.
There are also the issues of who should qualify the lead investors and what criteria
should be used. For example, should the platform or a third-party entity such as an as-
sociation be the accreditation organization for lead investors? Should the accreditation
criteria for lead investors be higher than that for crowd investors?
Compensation mechanisms
As lead investors are required to put in significant effort and take extra risk (e.g., 20%
investments), they need to be compensated more. The most common components of
lead compensation include a service fee and a carry (recall that carried interest is a pro-
portion of the proceeds from a successful exit). To earn the service fee, lead investors
must conduct a set of duties for crowds such as carrying out due diligence, preparing
investment documents, and disclosing risk. The service fee is paid when project fund-
ing succeeds, and it is usually 2% of the total funds raised. The carry is paid from the
exit profits, usually accounting for 20–25%.
The balance between the service fee and carry is an important issue. Because the
probability of successful exits is much lower and more remote than that of
successful funding, leads may be incentivized to earn the service fee, which is fas-
ter and easier, than waiting for the carry. Thus, this compensation structure may
motivate the lead to conspire with the project creators to cheat money out of
crowd investors.
Another issue with the lead compensation design is that a performance evalu-
ation on the lead is lacking. If the lead does a poor job in due diligence reports,
he or she may still receive his or her service fee. Furthermore, because the service
fee is contingent on project success, it incentivizes the lead to exaggerate the pro-
spect of the project so that he or she is more likely compensated. In an ideal set-
ting, therefore, the service fee would be paid upon the delivery of a satisfactory
service regardless of project funding success, while the crowd should be the judges
of whether the service is satisfactory.
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Disciplinary mechanisms
Currently, leads are not penalized for inflating the prospects of a project or for produ-
cing a low-quality due diligence report. Indeed, it may be difficult to verify ex post that
a lead purposefully misled crowd investors because of the inherent uncertainty of the
outcome. However, if a lead deliberately withholds facts that he or she knows or lies
about certain aspects of the project, he or she may still be held accountable.
The major problem is that platforms have no framework for imposing such a penalty.
One potential approach would be to involve reputation mechanisms and exploit the
power of a professional society/association. If cases of cheating and misconduct are
reported to the professional association, this may harm a person’s reputation, creating a
credible threat. However, given the emerging nature of lead investors, it is unclear
whether such “reputational concerns” could always be leveraged.
Certain dimensions of the lead investors’ work such as the informativeness or
thoroughness of their report may be readily assessable by crowd investors. Thus, their
service fees may be tied to crowd investors’ satisfaction. Currently, however, this is
missing from the compensation design. Crowds may also be involved in selecting the
lead investors from many candidates. Rules could also require lead investors to disclose
their relevant performance history and any conflict of interests with the platform or
project creator to ensure that crowd investors are equipped with the pertinent informa-
tion to choose lead investors. Such disclosure is currently rather limited.
Conclusion
Motivated by the several inefficiencies of crowds in crowdfunding platforms, this study
documents and compares two crowd designs: a popular pure crowd design and an
emerging hybrid crowd design. Based on our observations of industry practices and the
roles of crowds in crowdfunding platforms, we identify several of the shortcomings of
pure crowds, including their ineffectiveness in providing heavy-duty due diligence,
distortion in the wisdom of the crowds due to herding, social influence, and home bias,
and high management costs associated with a lack of a single voice. Thus, pure crowds
must be operated cautiously so that these shortcomings may be remedied. Based on
our analysis of crowdfunding processes and the characteristics of crowd and lead inves-
tors, we identify a host of factors that may determine the optimal choice of crowd de-
signs and present them in a framework for choosing between pure and hybrid crowds.
Finally, given the potential problems in managing lead investors in hybrid crowds, we
explore the issues of lead investor selection, compensation, and disciplining mecha-
nisms and propose possible solutions.
As a first study of hybrid crowd design, this study contributes to the crowdfunding
literature and to crowdfunding practice by opening the issue of crowd designs, recog-
nizing hybrid crowd as a novel crowd design, and offering our insights into managing
lead investors in hybrid crowds. Specifically, this study introduces the emerging hybrid
crowd design and seeks to stimulate more research on this topic by outlining several
testable hypotheses. Unlike previous studies that examine specific design elements in
pure crowds (such as project length and community functionality), this study examines
a high-level crowd design issue: choosing between pure and hybrid crowds in the
context of crowdfunding. Our comparisons of pure and hybrid crowds can shed light
on the evolution of crowd design in crowdfunding. In addition, both crowdfunding
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researchers and practitioners can benefit from our list of key driving factors behind the
crowd design. Our discussion on the management of lead investors points to ways in
which agency relationships in hybrid crowds could be further examined and opens a
new door for the application of agency theory in crowdfunding.
This study leads to several promising avenues for future research. The most obvious
one is to empirically test the propositions raised in this study. Second, the impact of
lead investors on the crowdfunding platform, project creators, and crowd investors
remains unclear. Third, our research points to potential agency problems in the
investor relationships. Indeed, no regulation framework for such lead investors is
present. Future research should thus aim to study lead investors and make further de-
sign and regulatory policy recommendations.
Based on our observations of crowdfunding platforms, we find that the degree of in-
volvement by the crowdfunding platform in different activities can hold large implications
for crowd and lead investors. For instance, crowdfunding platforms may develop tools
that help individual investors gather information and provide decision support, which
would reduce the crowd’s need for a lead investor. Future research could investigate
whether and how those tools improve crowdfunding effectiveness and efficiency.
Our study reveals the complex agency relationship among project creators, platform,
lead investors, and crowd investors. Many problems could arise when intermediaries
including the platform and lead investors have misaligned incentives. Although we sug-
gested some practical solutions for managing and regulating lead investors, it remains
worthwhile for future research to investigate how to design mechanisms that optimally
align the incentives of different parties.
Our study has some limitations of which readers should be aware. First, we draw our
conclusions based on industrial observations, a literature review, and informal arguments.
An empirical analysis based on a carefully curated dataset would thus be a great comple-
ment to this study. Second, our conclusions are drawn based on generic crowdfunding
practice, and we have not considered the differences in regulations and practices across
countries (Gabison 2014). Readers may adjust our conclusions to their specific situations.
Finally, while our conceptual framework of crowd design lists a number of key factors, it
is not exhaustive. For instance, we have not considered the risk tolerance of investors or
the risk control capability of the platform.
Endnotes
1The term “investor” used in this study can be interpreted as a lender, backer, and
supporter depending on the type of crowdfunding. Similarly, a “project creator” can be
interpreted as a borrower, seeker, and entrepreneur.
2A hybrid crowd is called a “syndicate” on the leading crowdfunding platform,
AngelList.
3How to manage and regulate platforms is another important topic; however, this is
outside the scope of the present study.
4The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small
Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers (May 13, 2016), Available at: https://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm.
5On Yuanshihui as well as other equity platforms such as AngelList, lead and crowd
investors typically form a Limited Liability Partnership in which the lead plays the role
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of the General Partner, while the other crowd investors act as Limited Partners. As
required by the Companies Act in China, there can only be one General Partner.
Therefore, Yuanshihui only allows one lead per project.
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